political scientist at football-u, outdoorsperson, gardener of two small humans, PI @ http://demos-lab.net, co-comrade @ https://thesisstatement.substack.com
yeah, we'll see what happens after the immunity decision...hoping to get our fatalism questions back out again in the field in several weeks. We've started tinkering with the question wording for the locus-of-control Qs, and I think we'll pull some additional sorting on C-E with the changes.
nice little write-up here by @uptonorwell.bsky.social. in particular, the catplot command is one of Stata's better work-around for paired-grouping histograms, although you're bound by "bar-axis" options, which deploy a weird syntax suite that isnt super intuitive
see: medium.com/the-stata-ga...
I’d bet the family farm that the GOP threatening to sue spooked the shit out of them + the only way for Kamala to step in would be Biden willingly resigning and he’s got way too much hubris to do that.
It's such a wild coincidence that the court legalized bribing public officials a few days ago and today says that every activity the US government regulates now goes through them
On the one hand, the election is five months away and the real value of Trump’s conviction is late-cycle attack ads hammering his criminality. Further, setting my expressive aesthetics aside, clogging up the cycle with Orange Man Crook is unlikely to persuade anybody. It’s baked in already. However…
One pretty big issue with this paper is that the DV is probably implicitly race-coded, so I guess it’s not that surprising that “democracy” doesn’t move subjects’ sympathies. If nuclear is ~western (implicitly white), then non-nuclear is probably stereotypically non-white. 1/2
the reluctance of the American public to support aggression against fellow democracies is made possible because the term “democracy” inadvertently primes the presumption that target countries are predominantly white.
www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
preliminarily: no change in democrats' diffuse support. supreme court legitimacy is in the proverbial shitter, folks. but, somewhat ironically, even *republicans* are now low key like maybe this thing is off the rails, too.
the big update, here, though, is the introduction in study three of a measure of supreme court "fatalism"...drawing on clinical and social psychology, we attempt to construct a measure of moroseness about the courts outputs. satisfaction measures suck. lets do better measuring specific support.
for a long time, legitimacy theory has argued "see this single item measure of satisfaction or ideological distance is unrelated to diffuse support." but ordinary ppl don't think like this, come'on. instead, this measure of fatalism functions as a summary measure of dissatisfaction.
The irony about this man writing a book about expertise and then being so thoroughly and exhaustingly wrong on so many topics never ceases to amaze me.
i grant the point but 888 cases in 21 years and then extrapolating that its a society killer...man, like, okay, but also thats like an order of magnitude so far down the road that i find myself going "ehhh?" then again recent events dont inspire so idk
idk if ppl still poast work but, tl;dr: dem cands may not push reform bc dems have low levels of legitimacy, which = weaker rankings of Court as electorally important compared to other issues, which has ironic effect of depressing demand for reform. survey + exp: www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
americans (reps+dems) dislike norm violations. but some (reps) still vote for norm-breakers. so we're back at vote choice. again. not public opinion abt norm-violations. vote choice. back-sliding is an elite-constraint problem; cant public opinion way out of it.
paper: tinyurl.com/normviopubop...
A general point about Netanyahu’s current political (mis)fortunes: he’s at a point where any decision, no matter how good or bad for others, is costly for him. His entire strategy is predicated on skirting actual decisions so any pressure that forces him to decide hastens his political demise.
'The army also decided during the first weeks of the war that, for every junior Hamas operative that Lavender marked, it was permissible to kill up to 15 or 20 civilians; in the past, the military did not authorize any “collateral damage” during assassinations of low-ranking militants.'